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UNBUNDLING FEDERALISM:
COLORADO’S LEGALIZATION OF
MARIJUANA AND FEDERALISM’S MANY
FORMS
JESSICA BULMAN-POZEN*
This short Essay argues that various attributes we associate
with federalism should not be deemed necessary components of
federalism as a definitional or normative matter. Using
Colorado’s recent legalization of marijuana as a case study, it
shows how two such attributes—an autonomous realm of state
action and independent state officials with distinctive
interests—can be pulled apart. State officials often further their
interests and effectively oppose federal policy when they
participate in the same statutory scheme as federal actors
instead of operating in a separate, autonomous sphere. At the
same time, state officials frequently rely on the autonomous
lawmaking and executive powers of state governments to
advance a decidedly national agenda, acting in cooperation
with federal officials rather than independently of them.
Unbundling federalism helps us get a purchase on these
pervasive practices instead of dismissing them as notfederalism.
INTRODUCTION
As we convene in Colorado on the one-year anniversary of
the state’s legalization of marijuana, it seems only fitting to
consider what this unfolding example may illuminate about
American federalism in the early twenty-first century. On one
account, a distinctive community—the western, libertarian
* Associate Professor, Columbia Law School. This Essay was prepared for the Ira
C. Rothgerber, Jr. Conference on Constitutional Law held at the University of
Colorado Law School from November 7 to 8, 2013. For stimulating conversations,
I am grateful to my fellow conference participants—Ming Hsu Chen, Heather
Gerken, Abbe Gluck, Melissa Hart, Sam Kamin, Amanda Leiter, Marc Poirier,
Erin Ryan, and Ernie Young—and to Henry Monaghan and David Pozen. I also
thank the editors of the University of Colorado Law Review for their excellent
editorial suggestions.
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people of Colorado—has used the State’s sovereign lawmaking
capacity to stake out a position different from the federal
government’s. And not just different—Colorado has picked a
fight with Washington, D.C., by adopting a policy that conflicts
with federal law and is overtly and deliberately oppositional.
This account embraces the classic tropes of federalism:
Sovereignty! Popular participation! Laboratories! Local
community! State-federal contestation!1
On another account, however, something very different has
occurred. National organizations and individuals across the
country have advanced a national agenda in a state forum.
Federal politicians and administrators have welcomed the
state’s choice instead of opposing it. And Colorado’s legalization
of marijuana is, as a practical matter, determining the content
of federal drug law rather than standing beyond it. This
account calls into question many of the classic tropes of
federalism: Out-of-state actors shaping state politics?
Intertwined state and federal authority? States as authors of
federal law?
It may be tempting to choose between these stories and to
proclaim American federalism either alive or dead, but there is
truth in both accounts. It was the people of Colorado—not the
people of Mississippi, or North Dakota, or the United States as
a whole—who voted to legalize marijuana; and yet the vast
majority of funds for the initiative came from outside the
state.2 State and federal law now take opposing positions on
marijuana; and yet state and federal enforcement regimes are
1. On some of these tropes, see, for example, DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 107–40 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE. L.J. 1425 (1987); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K.
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1260–61 (2009); Deborah
Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1988); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s
Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53–63 (2004); and Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987)
(book review).
2. See, e.g., John Ingold, Colorado Marijuana-Legalization Amendment
Spending Tops $3 Million, DENVER POST, Oct. 21, 2012, http://www.denverpost.
com/ci_21820068/colorado-marijuana-legalization-amendment-spending-tops-3million (“[B]oth sides report receiving more financial support from outside the
state than from inside it.”); Amendment 64: Legalizing Marijuana: Ballot Measure
Summary, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POL., http://www.followthemoney.org/
database/StateGlance/ballot.phtml?m=956 (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) (showing
that committees in favor of the ballot initiative raised nearly $3.5 million, of
which more than $3.2 million came from out-of-state sources).
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so interwoven that state law shapes how federal law is carried
out.3 Colorado’s sovereign lawmaking has catalyzed a fight
about the United States’ war on drugs; and yet this fight does
not pit state against federal actors but instead one group of
both state and federal actors against a different group of both
state and federal actors.4
Recognizing that each account captures something about
Colorado’s legalization of marijuana suggests a deeper point
about contemporary American federalism. Much state activity
today strains our traditional definition of federalism as a
system of coexisting state and federal governments, each with
independent government officials and a sphere of autonomous
authority untouched by the other.5 Time and again, we see
state and federal action occurring in overlapping, rather than
separate, spheres. Time and again, we see state and federal
officials using their respective authority to advance a single
national agenda, rather than distinct state and federal
agendas. Time and again, we see individuals across the country
participating in the politics of states in which they do not
reside. These practices need not, however, yield the conclusion

3. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all United
States Att’ys 2 (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
3052013829132756857467.pdf (“[T]he federal government has traditionally relied
on states and local law enforcement agencies to address marijuana activity
through enforcement of their own narcotics laws.”). See generally Michael M.
O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783 (2004) (describing
national drug policy as a cooperative federalism program involving federal
reliance on state enforcement).
4. For instance, the Drug Enforcement Administration continues to insist
that marijuana is properly criminalized, see THE DEA POSITION ON MARIJUANA
(2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/docs/marijuana_position_2011.pdf,
while some members of Congress have introduced bills in support of legalization,
see, e.g., H.R. 499, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1523, 113th Cong. (2013).
5. See, e.g., JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION 18–19 (2009) (defining
federalism in terms of geopolitical division of a federation into mutually exclusive
states; independent bases of state and federal authority; and constitutionally
declared sovereignty of both state and federal governments in at least one policy
realm); WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM 11 (1964) (“A constitution is federal if (1)
two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least
one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee . . .
of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere.”); Daniel Halberstam,
Federalism: A Critical Guide 6, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924939 (defining federalism in terms of “the coexistence
within a compound polity of multiple levels of government each with
constitutionally grounded claims to some degree of organizational autonomy and
jurisdictional authority”).
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that we are living in a post-federalist era.6
Instead, we might think more seriously about unbundling
federalism. Sometimes the various attributes we assign to
states—in particular, an autonomous realm of action and
officials who advance distinctive state interests—travel
together and our traditional definitions of federalism fit
comfortably. But often these attributes travel separately. State
officials may assert their distinctive interests by operating
within, rather than outside of, federal administrative schemes,
for example, or they may rely on their autonomous lawmaking
capacity to advance a national political platform. Unbundling
federalism helps us get purchase on these pervasive practices
instead of dismissing them as not-federalism.
Work in related areas underscores that unbundling can be
a rewarding move.7 It also underscores that “unbundling” can
mean many things. Here, I use the term to indicate that a
variety of attributes associated with federalism should not be
deemed necessary components of federalism as a definitional or
normative matter. Unbundling therefore prompts us to
consider how American federalism may operate even in the
absence of commonly assumed features. In this short Essay, I
can only just begin to unbundle federalism, but I hope this
might be a generative, or at least provocative, start.8
6. For a strong variant of that argument, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY &
EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM (2008).
7. See Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
1079 (2013) (arguing that constitutionality should be thought of as a bundle of
sticks rather than as a status with necessary conditions, and that no single
attribute should be deemed either necessary or sufficient for conferring
constitutional status on a rule); see also Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen,
The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385 (2008) (exploring the possibility
of a plural executive regime in which discrete authorities are parceled out among
various directly elected executive officials); Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled
Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148 (2013)
(proposing that labor law should allow employees to organize politically without
also organizing economically for collective bargaining purposes).
For works recognizing more than one variant of American federalism, see, for
example, Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context,
47 VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1994); Randy E. Barnett, Three Federalisms, 39 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 285 (2008); Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1549 (2012); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory
Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and
Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011); and Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of
Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (1994).
8. For instance, while I here take states to be the relevant unit of federalism
analysis, future work might unbundle federalism’s insistence on states. For a
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In what follows, I pull apart two of the attributes most
often ascribed to states: an autonomous sphere of action and
independent officials with distinctive interests. State officials
frequently further their particular interests and effectively
oppose federal policy when they participate in the same
statutory scheme as federal actors instead of operating in a
separate, autonomous sphere. At the same time, state officials
frequently rely on the autonomous legislative and executive
powers of state governments to advance a decidedly national
agenda, acting in cooperation with federal officials rather than
independently of them. In each case, appreciating the contours
of today’s federalism requires us to distinguish an autonomous
state sphere from independent state officials and to recognize
that neither is a necessary attribute of American federalism.
Once we unbundle this far, moreover, we can appreciate that
both autonomy and independence are multifarious concepts
and that today’s federalism may involve varying degrees of
each—or, to adapt the title of this symposium, our unbundling
of federalism may need to run “all the way down.”
I.

INDEPENDENT INTERESTS WITHOUT AUTONOMOUS ACTION

Vast swaths of American federalism involve joint statefederal regulation rather than separate spheres of state and
federal action. States implement federal law in areas ranging
from social welfare programs like Medicaid, Social Security,
and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; to
environmental programs like the Clean Air Act and the Clean
Water Act; to a variety of other schemes, such as immigration,
consumer protection, telecommunications, and financial
regulation.9 Even as the courts have blessed such cooperative
sample of the burgeoning literature arguing that non-state units, especially cities,
have strong claims to come within federalism’s ambit, see Heather K. Gerken,
Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010); Loren King,
Cities, Subsidiarity, and Federalism, NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY
(forthcoming June 2014); and Daniel Weinstock, Cities and Federalism, NOMOS
LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY (forthcoming June 2014). See generally
Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (1994) (arguing that a
normative rather than structural approach to federalism moves the focus away
from states to local governments).
9. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006) (immigration); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387
(2006) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–
7642 (2006) (Clean Air Act); 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5) (2006) (telecommunications);
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federalism programs,10 they have continued to describe the
states as sovereigns operating in an autonomous realm.11 In
the recent healthcare case, for instance, the Chief Justice’s
controlling opinion insisted that “[t]he states are separate and
independent sovereigns” while discussing Medicaid, a program
in which states administer federal law, relying on federal funds
and subject to federal superintendence.12
As scholars have noted, a vocabulary of separateness and
autonomy is inapt when it comes to cooperative federalism.
Rather than view “each jurisdiction as a separate entity that
regulates in its own distinct sphere of authority without
coordinating with the other,” we can only wrap our heads
around cooperative federalism programs if we accept that they
entail “a sharing of regulatory authority between the federal
government and the states that allows states to regulate within
a framework delineated by federal law.”13 To understand
cooperative federalism, that is, we must engage in a project of
unbundling—we must pull out of our usual federalism bundle
the insistence on an autonomous state sphere. In cooperative
federalism programs, there is no autonomous state sphere, only
overlapping, intertwined state and federal domains.
The absence of a separate state domain does not mean
states are powerless actors. Cooperative programs may
facilitate “uncooperative federalism” as states use the power
conferred on them by federal law to push back against federal

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1042(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 2012–14 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552)
(financial regulation); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, §§ 1101, 1311, 1321, 124 Stat. 119, 141–143, 173–179, 186 (2010) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001, 18031, 18041) (healthcare).
10. As long as they elicit voluntary state participation. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.,
joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167
(1992); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 (1982); Hodel v. Va. Surface
Mining Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
11. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York, 505 U.S.
at 144.
12. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.,
joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ).
13. Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001); see also, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR,
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2d ed. 1972); MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM (1966); ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2012);
Gluck, supra note 7; Joseph F. Zimmerman, National-State Relations: Cooperative
Federalism in the Twentieth Century, 31 PUBLIUS 15 (2001).
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objectives.14 To the extent they have distinctive interests,15
then, states may advance those interests from within
cooperative federalism schemes rather than solely from
separate spheres of autonomous state action. When Arizona
recently objected to federal immigration policy,16 for example,
its most successful opposition followed directly from the role
Congress has given states in the federal scheme. Federal law
contemplates that states will seek to determine the
immigration status of individuals within their borders, and it
requires the Department of Homeland Security to respond to
such state inquiries.17 Incorporating this provision into section
2 of its controversial law, Arizona seized on the assumed
cooperation of state and federal officials to advance a decidedly
uncooperative position.18 Notably, section 2 was the only
provision of the state law to survive a preemption challenge
before the Supreme Court, suggesting that uncooperative
federalism may be not only an effective way for states to
further their independent interests but, at least in some cases,
the only way.19
Indeed, in many areas in which the federal government is
the dominant actor—and would likely exercise sole authority
14. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 1; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459
(2012) [hereinafter Federalism as a Safeguard] (considering how states
administering cooperative federalism programs push back against the federal
executive branch in particular); Gerken, supra note 8, at 35 (emphasizing the
states’ “power of the servant”).
15. I am skeptical about the existence of distinctive state versus national
interests, as the remainder of this Essay and some of my prior work suggest. See,
e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014).
The point here, however, is that, to the extent these interests do exist, states may
advance them not only through an autonomous sphere of action, but also through
their role in federal statutory schemes.
16. See generally Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (considering
a challenge to portions of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 immigration law).
17. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2006).
18. Section 2 of Arizona’s law requires state officers to determine the
immigration status of arrestees by verifying their status with the federal
government, as 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) contemplates. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 111051(B) (2010). In back-to-back sentences in section 1 of the law, the state
legislature declares its intent to be realizing “cooperative enforcement of federal
immigration laws throughout all of Arizona” and, at the same time, ensuring that
the public policy of Arizona (in contrast to the public policy of the United States)
is “attrition through enforcement.” Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act, § 1, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070, as amended by Act of
Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2162.
19. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2492.
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were state and federal action deemed mutually exclusive—
states have relied on their administrative role to challenge
federal policy. From state resistance to the USA PATRIOT Act
and federal environmental policy to state reshaping of federal
welfare policy and the No Child Left Behind Act, examples
abound of states acting uncooperatively in cooperative
federalism schemes.20
That states exercise power in cooperative federalism
schemes is, in many ways, no surprise. It is a federalism-based
spin on the principal-agent problem familiar to many areas of
the law—and a spin that suggests a possible normative upside
to the classic problem.21 The slack in the system allows states
to advance their positions, and to challenge federal policy, even
while they are legally subordinate actors. Because the federal
government depends on the states to achieve its objectives,
states are able to prioritize within, push back against, and even
subvert federal law.22 Closely related, states have the power to
set the agenda through their implementation choices, and this
forces federal actors to engage with states in a reactive posture
rather than always having the power of inertia on their side.23
As insiders to the federal scheme, states also possess
knowledge and connections that facilitate their challenges to
federal policy.24 Even while they are insiders in important
respects, however, states remain outside the federal apparatus
in others. Most notably, state officials enjoy an independent
power base: their constituencies are state voters or other state
officials, not federal officials.25
20. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 1, at 1274–82.
21. See id. at 1262–64; Gerken, supra note 8, at 65–68. Regarding
uncooperative federalism as an attractive phenomenon depends on privileging
federalism values of state contestation and dissent. If one is focused on a different
set of concerns, say good policy outcomes, uncooperative federalism may look just
like any other principal-agent problem.
22. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 1, at 1266–68; cf. John P. Dwyer,
The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995)
(discussing federal reliance on accumulated state institutional competence and
expertise); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485,
1544 (1994) (arguing that the federal government’s reliance on the states
“guarantees state officials a voice in the process”); Weiser, supra note 13, at 671
(noting that states “exercise considerable discretion” in cooperative federalism
schemes and that federal reliance on state implementation makes the states “very
influential in practice”).
23. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 1, at 1287.
24. See id. at 1268–70.
25. See id. at 1270–71. While many state officials who implement federal
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Uncooperative federalism thus underscores that state
independence and state autonomy need not travel together. It
is the fact that state officials are independent of federal
officials that facilitates, and often motivates, their opposition to
federal policy. When state voters have different interests from
the national electorate, state officials may advance these
distinct interests. But these state officials are opposing federal
policy as they carry out federal law, rather than opposing
federal policy from outside of a federal scheme. Taking
uncooperative federalism seriously requires us to remove
autonomy from federalism’s bundle and to recognize that
federalism may involve independence without autonomy.
II. AUTONOMOUS ACTION WITHOUT INDEPENDENT INTERESTS
If contemporary federalism sometimes involves state
independence without a realm of autonomy, so too does it
sometimes involve state autonomy without independent state
and federal officials. Uncooperative federalism suggests that
states may advance their distinctive agendas from within
federal schemes. Other aspects of our federalism, meanwhile,
reveal that state and federal officials may use their
autonomous legislative and executive authorities to advance a
single agenda. State autonomy becomes a vehicle for furthering
a particular view of national policy, not for ensuring statefederal separateness.
Let me be clear about the kind of state independence I am
focusing on here. I have spoken of state and federal officials
enjoying separate bases of power, and I do not mean to
challenge that structural independence. Independently elected
or appointed officials may be an irreducible core of federalism—
or at least a feature that I am not prepared to jettison in these
few pages. But conceptions of independent state and federal
officials tend to assume that these independent electoral bases
yield state and federal officials who are independent in a
deeper sense—who have distinctive interests, commitments,
and agendas. It is this stronger form of state-federal
independence I mean to put under the microscope here.

programs are bureaucrats, others are state politicians. It is state politicians who
tend to generate the most vociferous opposition to federal policy, as the examples
in the text suggest.
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Many aspects of contemporary American politics and
culture pose a challenge to the idea of independent state actors
with distinctive interests standing apart from federal officials
and one another.26 New technologies have made it ever easier
to communicate, travel, and organize across state lines.
Doctrinal developments with respect to the Privileges and
Immunities and dormant Commerce Clauses and the First
Amendment have rendered state borders more porous.27
Partisan politics has made the entire country a single
battleground for partisan struggle. For these and other
reasons, state officials often have commitments and agendas
indistinguishable from their federal counterparts. And state
and federal officials frequently work together, either directly or
through various political organizations and ideological
networks, to achieve their ends.
Although this dynamic extends more broadly, it is clearest
with respect to partisan politics. State and federal political
actors today use both state and federal governments to
articulate, stage, and amplify competition between the
Democratic and Republican parties.28 Because today’s parties
are more ideologically cohesive and polarized than in the
past—and because this is true at both the federal and state
levels—states are critical sites of national partisan
competition. Rather than independent state officials advancing
state interests against national interests, state and federal
officials together advance a set of ultimately national
interests.29
Two points about such “partisan federalism” bear
emphasis here. First, while I have suggested that state and

26. See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 69–72
(2005); ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 16–26 (2009); cf. PING
REN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIFETIME MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 4
tbl. 2 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-07.pdf
(showing that more than half of Americans age twenty-five and older do not live
in their state of birth).
27. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (holding that whether
material is obscene must be evaluated under a reasonable person standard rather
than a community-specific standard); Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985)
(holding that a state rule limiting bar admission to state residents violated the
Privileges and Immunities Clause); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617 (1978) (holding that a state law banning use of waste disposal sites for waste
originating in other states violated the dormant Commerce Clause).
28. Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 15.
29. Id.
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federal officials alike advance national interests, partisanship
means that there is not one single national agenda. Instead,
there are competing interests and policy positions. We do,
therefore, witness competition between certain state and
federal actors, but this competition is not motivated by their
state and federal roles; it is motivated by partisan
commitments. Democratic officials in Massachusetts may
challenge a federal Republican administration, while
Republican officials in Texas may challenge a federal
Democratic administration, but this opposition follows from
partisanship, not from individuals’ state versus federal office as
such. Indeed, the Massachusetts Democrats will be supported
by Democrats within the federal government (and opposed by
Republican officials in other states), while the Texas
Republicans will be supported by Republicans within the
federal government (and opposed by Democratic officials in
other states).30
Second, states are important sites of national partisan
competition. While there are always both Democratic and
Republican politicians in the federal government, the minority
party has a limited set of tools with which to oppose the
majority, particularly when it comes to affirmatively advancing
an agenda rather than engaging in obstructionism. States have
a different set of tools. Most notably, states have their own
legislative and executive powers and may rely on their
regulatory autonomy to advance policies different from those
favored by the party in power in Washington, D.C. When
congressional Democrats could not advance climate change or
stem cell legislation during George W. Bush’s presidency, for
instance, Democratic states passed laws furthering the
Democratic agenda.31 When congressional Republicans could
30. State officials may also be opposed by other officials within their states
along partisan lines. Consider, for instance, the fights between Democratic
governors and Republican attorneys general, and Republican governors and
Democratic attorneys general, about whether to challenge Obamacare. See Kevin
Sack, In Partisan Battle, Governors Clash with Attorneys General over Lawsuits,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/us/politics/
28govs.html.
31. See, e.g., JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33812,
CLIMATE CHANGE: ACTION BY STATES TO ADDRESS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
(2008) (describing laws passed by Democratic legislatures in California, Hawaii,
and New Jersey to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and actions by twelve
other Democratic state legislatures to adopt California’s emissions standards);
Stem Cell Research, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
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not defund Planned Parenthood or pass voter ID laws during
Barack Obama’s presidency, Republican states passed laws
furthering the Republican agenda.32 On partisan lines, state
officials also make claims that the federal government is
encroaching on state sovereignty and that certain matters
should be left to the states. During the Supreme Court’s two
most recent terms, for example, Republican states challenged
Obamacare on this ground,33 while Democratic states
challenged the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).34
In these and many other instances, we see the significance
of state autonomy even in the absence of state-federal
independence. State officials are not carrying out a distinctive
state mandate, but rather a national partisan agenda, and they
are supported by federal officials and national groups.
Members of Congress joined states in their challenges to
Obamacare and DOMA, for instance, and national networks
like the American Legislative Exchange Council have drafted a
variety of state laws.35 There is, here, no meaningful
independence of state and federal actors; the relevant fault line
is not state-federal, but Democratic-Republican. Yet state
autonomy is a critical tool for state and federal actors alike. As
state autonomy becomes a vehicle for furthering partisan
commitments, rather than for shoring up state-federal
separateness, both state and federal actors look to the states as
critical actors in national politics.36
research/health/embryonic-and-fetal-research-laws.aspx (last updated Jan. 2008)
(describing laws passed principally by Democratic state legislatures between 2004
and 2008 to encourage and fund embryonic stem cell research).
32. See, e.g., AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, DEFENDING LIFE 2012, at 37–39 (2012)
(discussing laws passed by six Republican state legislatures to defund Planned
Parenthood); Voter Identification Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id.aspx#Legislation (last
updated Oct. 17, 2013) (describing state voter ID laws passed especially by
Republican state legislatures).
33. See Robert N. Weiner, Much Ado: The Potential Impact of the Supreme
Court Decision Upholding the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE 69
(Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013).
34. See Response of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Support of
Certiorari at 16, Bipartisan Legal Advisory Grp. of the U.S. House of
Representatives v. Gill, Nos. 12-13, 12-15 (U.S. July 20, 2012); Brief on the Merits
for New York as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).
35. See generally Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15, at 1096–1108.
36. Individuals throughout the country also look to the states. As I elaborate
in Partisan Federalism, partisanship leads individuals to identify with and feel
loyal to the states: Americans may identify with the states not because they
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There is much more that could be said about this dynamic,
but let me just note one implication for the long-running debate
about whether federalism is adequately protected by the
political process or whether judicial review is necessary.37 Our
leading account of the political safeguards of federalism argues
that state politicians will seek to protect state institutional
prerogatives and that federal officials will defer to these wishes
because of the ties that bind them to state officials.38 If we take
politics seriously, however, it is not clear why even state, let
alone federal, officials will seek to protect state autonomy
rather than to achieve particular substantive ends; indeed,
examples abound of state officials welcoming federal
“encroachment.”39 But if we take politics seriously, it also
becomes clear why some state and some federal officials
champion state autonomy—theirs is the party out of power in
Washington, D.C. It is not that they object to federal power as
such, but that they object to the partisan ends of a particular
federal administration.40 On this logic, the political safeguards
of federalism become bound up in the separation of powers and
intra-branch dynamics at the federal level.41 The key safeguard
represent something essentially different from the nation, but rather because they
represent competing Democratic and Republican visions of the national will. And
such state-based identification is thus particularly important when one’s party is
out of power in Washington, D.C. See id. at 1108–22.
37. Compare, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985) (recognizing political safeguards of federalism), JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) (same), and
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543 (1954) (same), with New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (insisting
on judicial review), United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (same), Steven G.
Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995) (same), and John C. Yoo, The
Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997) (same).
38. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 282 (2000).
39. For instance, the same states that challenged Obamacare as an intrusion
on state sovereignty supported DOMA as a valid exercise of federal power, while
those states that challenged DOMA as an intrusion on state sovereignty
supported Obamacare as a valid exercise of federal power.
40. Cf. George A. Krause & Ann Bowman, Adverse Selection, Political Parties,
and Policy Delegation in the American Federal System, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 359,
363 (2005) (“[A]s partisan congruence among national level political institutions
increases, the incentive to shift power to subnational counterparts
decreases . . . .”).
41. Cf. Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard, supra note 14 (considering
how states affect the balance of power across the branches of the federal
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of federalism is not the universal relationship between state
and federal politicians, but rather the role of the minority party
within the federal government and its ability to advance state
autonomy. While this change in emphasis does not resolve the
political safeguards debate, it does suggest a different set of
questions to be asking.
III. INTERROGATING AUTONOMOUS ACTION AND INDEPENDENT
INTERESTS
Neither autonomy nor independence is a unitary concept,
as the discussion so far has undoubtedly indicated. Even if we
bracket different ways to understand each term—a
heterogeneity I cannot begin to do justice to in this brief
Essay—and take autonomy to refer to a sphere of state action
and independence to refer to state officials’ distinctive
interests, it remains the case that neither autonomy nor
independence should be understood as an on-off switch. State
actors may enjoy varying degrees of autonomy and
independence from their federal counterparts. A project of
unbundling federalism therefore suggests that we might not
only pull apart autonomy and independence but also appreciate
varying degrees of autonomy and independence that may
underlie state action. Just as we may recognize federalism
when states advance independent interests without an
autonomous realm of action and when they use their
autonomous lawmaking and executive powers to advance
national interests, so too may we recognize federalism when
states act with partial but not complete autonomy and
independence.
To illustrate this point, let me return to where I began,
with Colorado’s recent Amendment 64 legalizing marijuana. As
I have noted, it is tempting to understand this development in
government); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001) (arguing that the separation of powers
protects state autonomy by limiting the number and kinds of federal laws that
may displace state law). Making federal law difficult to enact does not necessarily
protect state autonomy, as Clark argues; it privileges the legal status quo and
may thus operate to further federal authority. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The
Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1601 (2008). But the minority party may seek not only to obstruct federal
lawmaking but also to advance state autonomy, for example by insisting on a
federal law’s narrow preemptive effect.
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one of two quite different ways.42 On one account, Amendment
64 epitomizes both independent and autonomous state action: a
distinctive community with independent interests seized on the
state’s autonomous lawmaking capacity to take a position that
contradicts the federal government’s. On another account,
however, Amendment 64 epitomizes the absence of state
independence and autonomy: national organizations and
individuals outside the state bankrolled the initiative, which
should be understood as merely an expressive act in light of the
federal Controlled Substances Act’s continued criminalization
of marijuana. Unbundling federalism, and recognizing that
both independence and autonomy admit of degrees, reveals
that Colorado’s decision is neither a vindication of our
traditional bundled conception of federalism nor a sign of
federalism’s demise. It is instead a partially independent,
partially autonomous state act.
Start with the question of independent state officials. The
case for independence is in some respects especially strong: the
state actors involved were not elected officials but rather the
people themselves. Because Colorado adopted its legalization
policy through a ballot initiative, it sidestepped key national
influences on state action, such as party politics.43 If state
officials may lack distinctive state interests because of their
close connections to federal officials and national networks, the
same is not true when it is the state’s people making the
legislative choice. And, of course, it was the residents of
Colorado, not of neighboring Kansas, or Utah, or the United
42. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
43. While the legalization of marijuana appears to have an emerging partisan
valence—nearly twice as many Democrats as Republicans support legalization,
and more Democratic than Republican officials in both state and federal
governments have warmed to the cause, see, e.g., Art Swift, For First Time,
Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana, GALLUP (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.
gallup.com/poll/165539/first-time-americans-favor-legalizing-marijuana.aspx—it
is not a partisan issue. Neither the national Democratic nor the national
Republican party supports legalization, and even in Colorado, the Democratic
Governor opposed the state legalization initiative. See John Ingold, Colorado Gov.
John Hickenlooper Opposes Marijuana-Legalization Measure, DENVER POST, Sept.
13, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21530165/colorado-gov-john-hickenlooperopposes-marijuana-legalization-measure. The use of a ballot initiative thus
reflected direct democracy’s earliest aspirations—to create a channel for politics
beyond partisanship. See, e.g., THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE
POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 46–48 (1989) (quoting
Nathan Cree as stating in 1892 that direct democracy was intended “to break the
crushing and stifling power of our great party machines”).
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States as a whole, who voted in favor of legalization.
At the same time, we cannot fully understand Amendment
64 without attending to its national dimensions. For many
years now, a variety of national organizations have turned to
state ballot initiatives to push for the legalization of marijuana.
In Colorado, the vast majority of funds for Amendment 64 (as
well as funds opposing it) came from outside the state, as
Americans nationwide saw the state’s choice as a bellwether for
national change.44 Staff from national organizations also joined
the campaign in support of Amendment 64.45 As this suggests,
the state initiative did not advance an interest particular to
Coloradans; rather, it advanced an interest shared by many
Americans. Across the country, individuals and groups both in
favor of and opposed to legalization of marijuana have
recognized the state contest not as a local matter with import
only for the people of Colorado, but as a national contest with
significance for the entire country.
They are right to do so. Colorado’s legalization of
marijuana does not only—in a states-as-laboratories sense46—
generate a model for other states and perhaps the federal
government to consider. It also has immediate implications for
national policy because of the relationship between state and
federal schemes. Here we come to the question of state
autonomy. As with independence, a degree of state autonomy
clearly attended Amendment 64. The states and the federal
government each have their own criminal laws; when state
officials make an arrest for marijuana distribution or
possession, they do so as a matter of state law, not in order to
carry out a federal statute. Colorado’s decision to legalize
marijuana was therefore, in an important sense, an exercise of
state autonomy. The state relied on its separate lawmaking
powers and criminal code to enact a policy different from the
federal government’s.
Yet casting state and federal drug law as separate misses
much about the operation of these laws. The federal
44. See sources cited supra note 2.
45. Compare, e.g., John Ingold, Colorado Marijuana Activists Buttoned
Down to Win Legalization Measure, DENVER POST, Nov. 11, 2012,
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21973903/colorado-marijuana-activists-buttoneddown-win-legalization-measure, with Staff, NAT’L CANNABIS INDUST. ASS’N,
http://thecannabisindustry.org/staffs/staff (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).
46. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis J.,
dissenting).
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government has long relied on state enforcement of state law
as a means of enforcing federal law. In practice, that is, federal
drug law looks a lot like cooperative federalism: with 99
percent of arrests for marijuana made by state officials, the
federal government can rely on state enforcement of state law
to achieve federal objectives.47 Until it can’t. Colorado’s
challenge to federal law has force precisely insofar as state and
federal law are not separate but rather part of a single system.
If state law truly stood apart from federal law, federal law
would fill the void left by the state’s initiative, rendering the
state law merely expressive. But enforcement realities severely
complicate, even if they do not altogether foreclose, this
possibility. Colorado’s initiative affects federal law because it is
effectively a decision to opt out of a cooperative federalism
scheme. Ultimately, it exemplifies partial autonomy: Colorado
voters relied on the state’s lawmaking authority, but their
decision has real bite only because state law is intertwined
with federal law.
Amendment 64 is accordingly best understood as a
partially independent, partially autonomous state act. A
nationwide movement, with a distinctive but not state-specific
interest, has generated policy change in a state forum. Statefederal overlap, and in particular federal reliance on state
enforcement, gives the state law most of its force. The “inbetweenness” of Colorado’s action highlights a broader point
about contemporary American federalism: in critical respects,
national political conflict plays out in the states, with states
functioning as discrete sites of national governance for
Americans at large.48 In fifty fora, interests that lack a grip on
Washington, D.C., are able to translate their political
commitments into reality, and state action influences the
federal government in turn. Although understanding the states
as national actors poses a challenge to traditional, bundled
conceptions of federalism, it is often the best way to make
47. See O’Hear, supra note 3, at 806; Karen O’Keefe, State Medical Marijuana
Implementation and Federal Policy, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 39, 45 (2013);
see also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 645 n.10 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) (“[F]ederal officials . . . explained that federal drug policies rely
heavily on the states’ enforcement of their own drug laws to achieve federal
objectives.”).
48. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to
Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J.
1920 (2014).
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sense of states’ significance.
Indeed, while it is too soon to say what will come of
Colorado’s legalization of marijuana, we seem to be witnessing
a sort of “reverse preemption”—the displacement of federal law
by state law49—rather than the preemption of state law by
federal law.50 Shortly after Amendment 64 was adopted,
commentators began to question whether the federal
government would attack Colorado’s law on preemption
grounds—and whether, if it did so, it would be checked by the
prohibition on commandeering.51 Less noted in the legal
hubbub about whether the federal government might succeed
in an attempt to crack down on Colorado was why it might not
be in its interest to do so. Even bracketing a possible public
backlash, officials within the federal government have a
variety of different views about the criminal status of
marijuana, and Colorado’s actions created the opportunity for a
debate to occur inside the federal government. They also gave
federal officials more options, by putting “deference to state
law” on the table and thereby lending federal officials a lowerstakes way to side with legalization.52 Because the state’s
initiative forced the federal government to make some decision
about how to respond, it overcame perhaps the most powerful
force on the side of criminalization: inertia. With support from
certain actors within the federal government, then, Colorado is
reshaping federal as well as state drug policy, and Americans
49. Cf. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012) (allowing state
law to trump the Federal Arbitration Act when state law bars the arbitration of
insurance disputes); Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 37, United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (“To be sure, Congress may choose to
borrow state-law definitions as a matter of cooperative federalism . . . . But the
notion that Congress is somehow constitutionally required to do so—that state
law can ‘reverse preempt’ contrary federal statutes in this area, and eliminate
what otherwise would be the legitimate federal interest in uniform federal legal
rules of nationwide applicability—is wholly unprecedented and foreign to our
constitutional tradition.”).
50. Cf. Cole, supra note 3 (recognizing state legalization efforts and
suggesting that the federal government will not devote resources to enforcing the
federal prohibition on marijuana beyond particular priorities, such as fighting
criminal gangs and cartels).
51. See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Federal Supremacy: When
States Relax (or Abandon) Marijuana Bans, POLICY ANALYSIS, CATO INST. (Dec.
12, 2012), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA714.pdf; cf. Conant,
309 F.3d at 646 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (adopting an anti-commandeering
argument).
52. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15, at 1129–30.
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throughout the country are invested in this experiment, as
Colorado extends the arena for national governance beyond
Washington, D.C. While only time will reveal the effects of
Colorado’s initiative on the United States’ war on drugs, it
already underscores the need to think more flexibly about
contemporary federalism.

